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Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better. 
Samuel Beckett, Worstward Ho, 1983 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It would seem clear that an institutional explanation for the wealth of nations is now the 
leading one within economics. Institutions encompass the set of political and legal 
arrangements that provide the environment in which economic activity takes place. This 
contrasts sharply with the dominant tradition in 20th century economics which attempted to 
understand prosperity as a technical problem, to work out the best means of improving social 
welfare under the assumption that the political elite would wish to do so. Along with the 
largely hidden assumption of a complete set of property rights, economics was thus largely 
divorced from institutional analysis. Under this approach, where clear disparities in the 
wealth of nations appear it would be tempting to conclude that is due to a lack of 
enlightenment. Improved knowledge of economics should provide the platform for future 
prosperity. Politics and law do not seem to matter. This, of course, is a caricature. Very few 
economists would have argued that politics does not matter, but they might have said that 
political analysis was not the remit of the trained economist.  
 
The publication of the two books to be reviewed here, confirms that this perspective is no 
longer that of the mainstream economics profession. The authors are four of the most 
prominent economists in the world and they place political analysis at the centre of the 
economist’s approach to understanding the sources of prosperity. Failure to improve 
institutions generally results in a failure to implement welfare improving policies and thus it 
is crucial to understand why it has been difficult for poor nations to construct good 
institutions. Both books should accelerate the deeper inclusion of political analysis in various 
economics courses, but particularly in public and development economics. While there was 
an awareness of the public choice argument that the rules of the game determined the play of 
the game, public choice analysis has generally been viewed as non-mainstream by the 
economics profession (even after the award of the Nobel prize to James Buchanan in 1986). 
These authors are from the very heart of the mainstream. The two books share the same 
theme, but they are dissimilar in that Besley and Persson’s book is written primarily for an 
academic audience and Acemoglu and Robinson’s book is aimed at the general reader, 
although this is to a large extent a popular follow up to their well-known academic text from 
2006.  
 
2. Pillars of prosperity 
 
I will begin with the Besley and Persson text. The book gathers and expands upon a number 
of academic papers that they have published in the last four years. In a very clear opening 
chapter (which also provides a useful summary of the whole book), they begin with a quote 
from Adam Smith who identified ‘peace, easy taxes and a tolerable administration of 
justice’, as the requirements that ‘carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the 
lowest barbarism’. So from the start we are reminded that modern political economics with 
its focus on politics is in many ways a return to the concerns of the founders of economics 
who distinguished the discipline as political economy. The authors are careful to clarify what 
they take Smith’s three pillars of prosperity to mean; ‘easy taxes’ are for them 
administratively easy to collect and they are not primarily concerned with constraints 
imposed by the standard concerns of incentives and political competition; ‘peace’ means 
internal to a nation rather than external and ‘justice’ is primarily concerned with security of 
contract and property rights. In the period when economics was more divorced from politics, 
issues such as the underlying ability of the state to tax or the security of property rights were 
simply assumed. A society that can achieve these capacities will form an ‘effective’ state 
from which prosperity can emerge. They define a development cluster as one that exhibits a 
positive correlation between income per capita, state capacity (a combination of fiscal and 
legal capacity) and absence of political violence. They demonstrate empirically these 
correlations and while some readers may be fussy regarding how they measure these features, 
the evidence does seem fairly compelling. They explain that each subsequent chapter builds 
upon the one before to expand the core model so as to endogenise previously exogenous 
variables and to introduce new variables of interest, so that by the end of book a full typology 
of different kinds of state is provided and by extension gives an explanation for the inequality 
in prosperity of nations across the globe. 
 
Chapter 2 constructs the core model that is used throughout the book. It presents the 
conditions required for costly investments in fiscal capacity to be made. The model consists 
of two periods and two groups consisting of an incumbent and opposition, such that in each 
period the incumbent (the opposition could become the incumbent in period two) gets to 
choose spending in public goods and make transfers to the two groups given the constraints 
created by income, current fiscal capacity and resource income. In period one, the incumbent 
can choose to invest in fiscal capacity. They will do so if they foresee the benefits created by 
an increased tax base in period two as compensating for reduced spending on public goods 
and/or transfers in period one. With this simple set-up, three types of state are identified 
dependent on whether two conditions hold or not. These are the cohesiveness and the stability 
conditions. Cohesiveness arises if there are likely to be highly valued public goods and/or if 
the incumbent knows that if they are removed from power they would still receive a large 
share of any transfers the new incumbent might make. This may relate to a strong system of 
checks and balances in the political institutions. The stability condition relates to the 
likelihood of the incumbent retaining power. If cohesiveness holds, the incumbent will invest 
in fiscal capacity and this is called a common-interest state. If it does not hold they will still 
invest if political stability is high. This is a redistributive state where the incumbent is not 
worried about losing power and increases fiscal capacity to potentially extract larger transfers 
from the opposition. If neither condition holds, the state is defined as weak and no investment 
is made in fiscal capacity. Compared with the behaviour of an idealised Pigouvian planner, a 
common-interest state is efficient; a redistributive state is efficient (though not in a standard 
utilitarian sense) and a weak state is inefficient. This implies a central problem of 
commitment in politics. A set of mutually welfare-enhancing institutions often cannot 
credibly be devised to prevent abuse of power at a later stage. Microfoundations for the 
model are discussed, various extensions are made and empirical evidence is provided which 
shows correlations between proxies for parameters in the model that measure cohesiveness 
and stability and the measure for fiscal capacity (share of total taxes in GDP). Some of the 
proxies for the parameters are very interesting. For example, a measure of common-interest 
spending is the proportion of years in external war from 1816-2000. The authors openly 
admit that the empirical work is purely illustrative, but it is convincing. It also goes against a 
commonly made argument that a low tax economy is a wealthy economy.  
 
In chapter 3 the authors move on to the second pillar of prosperity; legal capacity. Here the 
legal system is viewed as ‘market-supporting regulation’ such as protection of property 
rights. As a result, investments in legal capacity lead to higher incomes. The key finding in 
this chapter is that investments in fiscal and legal capacity tend to be complementary. 
Increases in income through the expansion of legal capacity make an increase in fiscal 
capacity more attractive. If fiscal capacity is expanded, the incentive to invest in legal 
capacity to increase the tax base is increased. The results therefore are the mirror of those in 
the previous chapter. Virtuous and vicious cycles emerge given the positive feedback 
between state capacity and income. Interestingly, natural resources suggest less of a need to 
invest in capacity and the authors suggest this as a reason for why we may see a lower level 
of state capacity in resource or aid dependent countries in Africa or parts of Asia. The chapter 
analyses the possibility of differential application of the law and predation, as opposed to 
equality in the form of the ‘rule of law’. The empirical analysis is expanded to include a 
measure of legal capacity and includes legal origins as a means of capturing the cost of 
investing in legal institutions. Very usefully, the authors locate where their work stands in 
development economics literature. They argue that the development literature split into 
underdevelopment due to lack of technology following Solow (1956) or underdevelopment 
due to resource misallocation following Lewis (1954). This book follows the resource 
misallocation tradition, but caused in large part by a lack of incentives due to the underlying 
institutional structure. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 cover the final of the three pillars; whether a society experiences political 
violence or not and how this interacts with state capacity to determine prosperity. Political 
stability is now endogenised as a function of the efforts the two groups make in winning a 
fight should it happen. Chapter 4 excludes state capacity, holds income exogenous and finds 
that the same factors that generated state capacity are also likely to generate peace. Highly 
valued public goods, a credible and relatively even share of political power, non-dependence 
on natural resources and high income all create the conditions for peace and their opposite 
values point to civil war or repression (one-sided conflict). Whether violence is mutual or 
one-sided will depend on the fighting abilities of the two sides and the cost of fighting. 
 
Chapter 5 brings all three pillars of prosperity together and establishes a state space of nine 
possibilities emerging from the matrix of common-interest, redistributive and weak states on 
the one hand and peace, repression and civil war on the other. A key finding is that if a state 
has highly valued public goods and/or a fairly equal distribution of power then they will be 
both peaceful and a common-interest state. There are no constellations of parameter values 
that allow for common-interest states that are repressive or in civil war. There are, in contrast, 
constellations of parameter values that allow for permutations of the six remaining states. The 
worst of these is a weak state in civil war. Such a state exhibits a lack of commonly held 
highly valued public goods, poor checks and balances, evenly distributed fighting skills, low 
cost of fighting and a high level of natural resources. Such a state is the ultimate failed state, 
but there are variations of unhappy states exhibiting weakness or redistribution on the one 
hand and/or repression or civil war on the other. Because happy states seem to be happy in 
only one way (peaceful and common-interest) and unhappy states can be unhappy in six 
different ways, Besley and Persson label this the Anna Karenina matrix.1  
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 This follows from the famous opening line of Tolstoy’s novel, “All happy families resemble each other; every 
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”. 
With the full model in place, the authors in chapter 6 discuss the thorny topic of development 
assistance within the boundaries that their model has established. As aid is essentially 
additional to resource rents, unconditional aid will have a similar effect as resource rents and 
it is not good. In this case, the model predicts it will increase the likelihood of political 
violence and reduce investments in state capacity. To this extent, it puts the authors in the 
camp of aid ‘pessimists’ such as Easterly (2006), as opposed to those that they label 
optimistic ‘traditionalists’ such as Sachs (2005). However, there is an alternative path offered 
by ‘conditional optimists’ such as Collier (2007) and it is through the effect of technical 
assistance in improving the value of public good projects that their model would offer support 
for such intervention. They point to the increasing use of randomised controlled trials (see 
Banerjee and Duflo, 2011, for an overview) to identify these types of interventions. 
Obviously interventions that make for cohesive political institutions should in principle be for 
the good. This could provide a justification for intervention in Afghanistan or Iraq, but there 
is a major catch. Creating institutional checks and balances is not enough. The institutions 
need to be credible.  
 
Cohesiveness of institutions had been treated as exogenous throughout the book, but given its 
central importance in generating prosperity it is treated as endogenous in chapter 7. They 
identify that political competition is the main determinant as to how cohesive the incumbent 
may choose the institutions to be. If they feel there is no threat, they are less likely to create 
checks and balances than if there is a good chance they will lose power in the future. This 
strongly echoes the Acemoglu and Robinson book. In the final chapter, the key issues in the 
book are summarised. They construct a Pillars of Prosperity Index. This is done by 
combining data on income, state capacity and political violence. Given that these are 
endogenous in their model, they then ask how well the exogenous variables of their model 
predict the index values. India and China underperform compared to their prediction and an 
explanation offered is that both countries are ‘catching up’ to the level where their institutions 
suggest they should be. As regards over-performers such as Singapore and Kuwait, a 
potential explanation is that the theory says nothing about the good fortune of having benign 
leaders. They finish with a number of issues, one of which on identity, I will return to later.  
 
The book has provided a core model that provides a set of variables with which the three 
pillars of prosperity (fiscal, legal and absence of violence) that determine prosperity are 
endogenised. The model becomes increasingly rich, but the authors write very clearly and 
order the book in a very manageable way. For example, each chapter keeps the development 
of the core model nicely separate from extensions that can be made to it. The model proves 
useful when asking practical questions with regard to development aid and gives insight into 
the potential for political reform. The authors also make an admirable effort to bring data to 
the analysis. A major achievement, in my view, is that they have connected the theory and 
empirics of political violence, where within the existing literature there has been a serious 
disjoint. It is an ambitious book that must be an essential read for all political economists. It 
also comes with an excellent guide to the literature at the end of each chapter. For those 
wanting fixes they should be warned, the ambition of the book lies in explaining lack of 
prosperity rather than in original suggestions as to how matters can be improved. This is 
precisely the institutional view of economic prosperity. Only by first understanding how 
nations came to be the way they are, can we understand better when policy interventions may 
help or, indeed, given the institutional set-up, may make things worse. 
 
 
 
3. Why nations fail 
 
Besley and Persson present an ambitious fusion of political science with economics. 
Acemoglu and Robinson take the same ingredients and add history to create a simple, but 
powerful theory for the origins of prosperity. This is explicitly written as a book geared 
towards a broad audience and brings together the academically targeted work of the co-
authors (and others) over fifteen years. This is one of the most enjoyable reads that I have 
encountered in political science or economics. The ambition is huge. It lays out a clear theory 
and provides historical examples as evidence, which range across the globe and from the 
depths of time up to the modern day. I suspect some professional historians may grimace at 
such a wide-ranging approach, as they may feel that the discussion of each historical case 
lacks depth and is partial, only seeking evidence that backs the theory. While such a criticism 
may be valid to a degree, it will not matter to readers (and this includes most economists) 
who have large gaps in their historical knowledge, and where the knowledge they do possess 
has not been refined by an over-arching theory. For those readers (and I certainly include 
myself), this book is deeply thought-provoking and provides a wealth of insight. It is though 
somewhat pessimistic. Although economics is often labelled the ‘dismal science’ most 
economists are actually by inclination fairly optimistic, forever seeking policy changes that 
will improve the lot of most citizens. Acemoglu and Robinson tell us that such endeavours 
may be largely hopeless unless the institutional framework is right and this book aims to 
explain why so many nations do not have the right institutions. Further, institutions are very 
hard to change and thus the somewhat pessimistic tone. 
 
Acemoglu and Robinson draw the distinction between extractive and inclusive economic and 
political institutions, and that extractive economic institutions tend to be caused by extractive 
political institutions. Inclusive economic institutions ‘must feature secure private property, 
an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing 
field in which people can exchange and contract; it also must permit the entry of new 
businesses and allow people to choose their careers.’ (pp.74-75). With these features in 
place, economic activity and productivity growth will follow. Extractive economic 
institutions do not provide confidence in private property. They are rife with corruption and 
theft and there is a strong resistance to change. A key feature of inclusive economic 
institutions is ‘creative destruction’, the acceptance that the new (and more efficient) can 
replace the old (and inefficient). Given the inefficiency of extractive economic institutions 
one might expect them to disappear over time. Acemoglu and Robinson’s key point is that 
they are robust because they are supported by extractive political institutions. These are 
political institutions that concentrate power in the hands of the few, whereas inclusive 
political institutions are pluralistic and spread political power more evenly. It is in the interest 
of the powerful elite to deliberately maintain extractive economic institutions because this 
keeps the potential opposition relatively weak by preventing the unleashing of creative 
destruction, a consequence of which is that the elite could find themselves replaced 
politically, just as old economic entities are replaced by new ones. Although the extra wealth 
created by the formation of inclusive economic institutions should create the possibility of 
compensating the elite for a loss of power, the elite realise that there is no credible deal that 
could be struck. Some nations are more fortunate and the elite surrender power either 
voluntarily or through the use of force and inclusive institutions are thus created.2 Given 
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 Voluntary reform of institutions in the Acemoglu and Robinson approach is largely conducted due to outside 
threats. There is no violence, but the fear of it causes elites to surrender some power. For an interesting contrast, 
Congleton (2011) in his analysis of western democracy sees much of the institutional changes that were made as 
these forces and the existence of virtuous and vicious feedback loops, huge disparities in the 
wealth of nations have evolved over time. In addition, the poorest nations in the world have 
been especially cursed in that they failed to develop any meaningful set of institutions. There 
was very little in the form of political centralisation so as to provide a powerful state. A state 
which is extractive, but centralised may exhibit a reasonable standard of living, at least for a 
proportion of its citizens. A state which has not centralised (often due to the battle to obtain 
control of extraction) will not be able to achieve even that. 
 
The authors spend a chapter rejecting alternative theories, which they label 1) the geography 
hypothesis; 2) the culture hypothesis and 3) the ignorance hypothesis. Although the authors 
show considerable respect for the geographical thesis of Diamond (1997), they argue that we 
only need to observe a town such as Nogales on the Mexican/United States border to see that 
the huge disparity of wealth either side of the border cannot be explained by geography. 
Clearly, it is due to one side being in Mexico and the other being in the United States. One 
could go on and consider North and South Korea and East and West Germany as further 
examples. They dismiss cultural arguments as a by-product of institutional histories and the 
ignorance hypothesis is dismissed on the basis that when one digs deeper, one will find that 
extractive economic institutions that clearly look like very bad ideas given our knowledge of 
economics, are actually deliberately put in place to preserve extractive political institutions 
and the power of the elite. 
 
The authors develop a number of themes based around the extractive/inclusive, 
economic/political, centralised/uncentralised distinctions in order to shed light on the 
emergence and persistence of institutions and circumstances under which they might change. 
The primary explanation they give for the experience of Nogales, is the differential 
institutions that emerged due to colonisation by the Spanish versus colonisation by the 
British. The British intended to colonise as the Spanish did, exploiting large indigenous 
populations and the existence of abundant natural resources, but these features did not really 
exist in the north of the Americas relative to the south. Coercion was not an option for 
Britain, so wealth would have to be generated through incentives for settlers and incentives 
came with formalised political rights. These initial experiences of colonisation and the quite 
different economic and political institutions that subsequently emerged (such as the 
constitution of the United States) provide an explanation for the current disparity of wealth 
between North and South America. 
 
A key aspect of Acemoglu and Robinson’s analysis is that institutions are persistent, but there 
are critical junctures when significant change is more likely. An example is the arrival of the 
Black Death in the 1300’s. The shortage of labour made labour more powerful.  More 
powerful labour was accommodated in England, but was repressed in east Europe. A second 
example is the emergence of Atlantic trade after the discovery of the Americas in the 1600’s. 
The grip of the Crown in England was that bit weaker than in France or Spain and this 
allowed a merchant class to emerge in England and further extend political pluralism, 
whereas in France and Spain the monarchs were strengthened. By the time of the Civil War 
in England and subsequent attempts to restore absolutism, a powerful coalition of resistance 
had formed which ensured the victory for inclusive institutions. The authors point to the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688, when the new, invited, King William III accepted the primacy 
of Parliament, which set the conditions for the inclusive institutions (in particular property 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
truly voluntary in that they were mutually advantageous both for incumbent elites and opposition groups. For a 
discussion of Congleton’s book, see Tridimas (2012). 
rights) that led to the Industrial Revolution. The authors also accept that contingency plays a 
crucial role. What would have happened if the English had not defeated the Spanish Armada? 
 
We often observe high levels of growth, under what would clearly seem to be extractive 
institutions. The famous example of the 20th century is the Soviet Union. The authors argue 
that we should not be deceived into thinking that this is similar (or indeed better) to the type 
of growth displayed in nations with inclusive institutions. It may be that growth is driven by 
increased centralisation and coercive reallocation of resources, but it is not sustainable 
because it does not allow for economic incentives and creative destruction. These cannot be 
allowed because they will threaten the power of the elite. Eventually growth did peter out in 
the Soviet Union, as did the state itself. The authors predict that the astonishing growth we 
observe in China will go the same way unless Chinese institutions become more inclusive. 
They echo Besley and Persson and suggest that the growth is largely catch-up. 
 
Inclusive institutions can become extractive. The authors point to Rome which moved from 
being a partially inclusive republic to a principate to a naked empire. What caused this? As 
soon as inclusiveness starts to slip, and there are large rewards for being in power, infighting 
will result which in turn accelerates economic decline. The authors dismiss the idea that the 
Roman settlement of Britain had anything to do with Britain’s future inclusive institutions 
and subsequently the Industrial Revolution. Britain instead was marked by a succession of 
incremental victories against the Crown and the aristocracy, from the Magna Carta in 1215 
up to the Glorious Revolution and beyond to the First Reform Act of 1832, Repeal of the 
Corn Laws in 1846 and universal suffrage in the 20th century. Why at various points was 
there not more resistance to this process given that there was always some narrow, powerful 
group that could benefit from preventing increasing inclusivity? A distinguishing feature of 
Britain was that opposition to such groups was composed of a broad coalition of interests, so 
that it could not be the case of one narrow extractive elite being replaced by a new narrow 
one because the opposition contained groups with contradicting interests. The opposition was 
also powerful and could issue a credible threat. Building ever more pluralistic institutions, by 
preventing the potential exploitation of one group prevented the exploitation of all groups. By 
the time of the Industrial Revolution property rights were secure and creative destruction was 
unleashed. 
 
In many other examples, creative destruction was actively prevented by the elites. Russia and 
Austria-Hungary blocked new technologies and infrastructure development because they 
could see the potential for shifts in power as a result. At least these nations were reasonably 
centralised, others, such as Somalia, could not even make the investment in the basic 
functions of a state such as the provision of order for fear that the power of the state once 
created ends up in opposition hands at a later stage. 
 
In addition to states, such as Rome, which slipped from partial inclusiveness to becoming 
extractive, a depressing tale is told of states that displayed inclusiveness but were made 
extractive due to colonisation. The authors argue this was the experience of south-east Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa. This had further negative effects in that some societies rationally did 
not develop further for fear of attracting the attention of colonisers. This book, like Besley 
and Persson, picks up on the key role of resource misallocation as the source of 
underdevelopment as identified by Lewis (1954). The optimistic view of the ‘dual economy’ 
is that output would be massively increased as labour moves from the traditional economy to 
the modern technological economy, However, Acemoglu and Robinson convincingly argue 
that the dual economy is not something that will disappear as a natural result of economic 
development, but rather it was the deliberate choice of an extractive elite to establish such a 
state of affairs. They give the example of Apartheid South Africa operating a dual economy 
as a means to maintain white control. 
 
Inclusive institutions can be exported and Napoleon emerges as a rather heroic figure in this 
book. Following the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic wars, significant 
institutional change of the inclusive kind began to emerge throughout Europe. Bringing these 
various arguments together we can begin to understand the fact that development is to a large 
extent geographically clustered, without using a geographical explanation for this 
observation. 
 
The authors also identify a reason why we do not see much change over time in the ranking 
of nations by wealth. There are virtuous and vicious cycles between types of institutions. A 
key aspect of inclusive institutions is that power is more evenly spread so that the stakes tend 
to be lower, allowing for further inclusiveness. The opposite applies in extractive states. The 
stakes are very high and if a strong repressive state cannot exert control, civil war and state 
failure is more likely to follow. Interestingly, when the stakes become lower resistance to 
change will start to fade. As an example, they argue that migration of blacks from the deep 
south of the United States and mechanisation of the cotton industry paved the way for the 
acceptance by whites of the collapse of the Jim Crow laws in the south. 
 
Various types of modern day state failure are discussed. From the lawlessness of Somalia, to 
the partial inclusive/extractive nations of South America, to the absolutism of Uzbekistan and 
other states of the ex-Soviet Union. The latter tale of modern day, state organised child labour 
is deeply depressing. On the other hand, happier stories are told. Botswana appear to have 
benefitted from the major good luck of having publically motivated leaders, and China at the 
critical juncture following the death of Mao was fortunate that Deng Xiaoping came to power 
rather than the ‘Gang of Four’.  
 
The book finishes on a rather pessimistic note, at least, pessimistic from an interventionist, 
aid perspective. They argue that a modern success story, Brazil, was not built on aid but 
rather, ‘the consequence of diverse groups of people building inclusive institutions’ (p. 457). 
Why label this pessimistic? The reason is that Acemoglu and Robinson demonstrate that 
institutions change very slowly, so the development economist’s instinct that something can 
be done here and now is misguided and perhaps even misplaced if it causes more harm than 
good.  
 
There is, though, an uplifting aspect to the book. The central message is really quite simple. 
Any society that has allowed individuals to flourish has prospered. So underlying any 
complex story about technology adoption is another more basic story.  The reason such 
technological advances were made, such as the astonishing display of ingenuity during the 
Industrial Revolution, is that institutions were such that individuals knew that investments in 
their own ability would be worthwhile. They had rights to their property and could trust the 
state would not steal their investment ex post. The surprising fact of human history is just 
how difficult it has been to achieve and maintain such societies. 
 
4. Comparative discussion 
 
That the two books overlap and share the same broad themes barely needs stating. Extractive, 
centralised institutions are analogous to redistributive, repressive states. Nations that fail to 
achieve political centralisation are analogous to war infected weak states. Inclusive 
institutions are analogous to peaceful, common-interest states. Besley and Persson are 
primarily concerned with setting up a general model that links underlying parameters such as 
the value of public goods and political institutions to the observation of state capacity and 
prosperity. Acemoglu and Robinson are more directly concerned with accounting for the 
nature of political institutions as a battle (or non-battle) between various groups as a means to 
explain prosperity. Clearly, there is considerable agreement between the two approaches on 
the central importance of inclusive/cohesive political institutions and that such institutions are 
difficult to achieve.  
 
Readers of the European Journal of Political Economy are also likely to find much of the 
substance of the argument to be very familiar (although presented quite differently) from the 
work of the public choice tradition. Besley and Persson are careful to reference works by 
Buchanan and Tullock and others, but Acemoglu and Robinson do not in this book (or indeed 
in their 2006 book) reference this literature much beyond the work of Olson. There are clear 
links though. For example, Tullock (1983) argues that income redistribution is not 
determined by altruism or a social welfare function but rather is determined through the 
political process according to how much beneficiaries of redistribution are able to take. This 
closely mirrors the theories of extraction and redistribution presented in the two books 
reviewed here. Nonetheless, in response to those that may make the charge that the 
approaches are not as novel as they might seem, I would argue that the methodologies, the 
attempt to relate to the data (Besley and Persson), historical case studies (Acemoglu and 
Robinson) and the details of the theories that are presented are absolutely novel.  
 
There are some differences in emphasis in the two books. The first concerns the role for 
policy and optimism. Banerjee and Duflo (2011) write a very different book to that of the two 
reviewed here, in that they look at issues in development at the absolute micro-level. They 
argue that detailed, micro-level interventions can make a big difference and a theory such as 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s fails to pick this up. This rather more optimistic perspective is 
picked up in Besley and Persson’s approach, in the role played by highly valued public goods 
as a determinant of state capacity and prosperity. They identify the role for randomised 
controlled trials (as conducted by Banerjee and Duflo and others) as a means to find such 
highly valued public goods. Nonetheless, the emphasis on institutions has surely tempered 
much of the naïve optimism that once existed in development economics. Other authors 
would agree with Acemoglu and Robinson, but use the institutional perspective to argue for 
institutional solutions that are available today if we so wish. For example, Acemoglu and 
Robinson point out that a key reason for the demise of the Jim Crow south was the 
availability of federal allies in the north. Essentially, if a powerful coalition can be formed, 
vested interests can be dislodged. This is a similar point made by Collier (2009) who argues 
for relatively cheap military threats to be made by rich countries against abuse of power in 
poor countries. This moves the problem beyond national borders to recognise international 
coalitions. The problem, of course, is selling such an institutional response to the citizens of 
the rich countries, and if the threat needs to be carried out can the commitment be made 
credible in the long-term. Another difference in the two texts, I would argue, is the emphasis 
on geography. Acemoglu and Robinson deny it having a major role, but Besley and Persson 
implicitly suggest that it may play a major role given the role that natural resource rents play 
in their model in reducing the incentive to invest in state capacity and to engage in political 
violence. Natural resources tend to come with a specific geographical location and this 
implies a role for geography in determining prosperity. 
 
In both books, the ability to achieve collective action plays an important role in the 
background. Groups must be able to form and be active to achieve political power. Olson 
(1982) placed the role of collective action at the centre of his theory of national prosperity. 
By not discussing collective action explicitly, both books may miss a further potential 
difficulty for the reform of bad institutions. An implicit assumption is that individuals tend to 
act only in their economic interests. I agree that this is generally the correct assumption, but 
engaging in collective action may bring into play features that are not obviously in the 
economic interests of the individual. This relates to the idea of expressive behaviour. In most 
settings of collective action, individuals are very unlikely to be decisive in determining the 
outcome of the group action. This means that they are more likely to choose expressively 
rather than instrumentally, and the former need not be concerned with economic interests 
(Hamlin and Jennings 2011). Expressive preferences may focus on issues of identity, which 
run contrary to their instrumental economic interests, but since collective action exaggerates 
the role of expressive preferences they can dominate the choice of individuals within the 
group and as a result the group choice overall, (Hillman, 2010). As an example, in China the 
standard view is that greater political and economic rights will need to be extended to avoid 
future political turmoil. An alternative view is that the Chinese elite understand expressive 
logic and this may explain the recent rise in Chinese nationalism. Extractive leaders can use 
identity as a means to keep the people on side without having to relinquish power. This 
contrasts sharply with the discussion of identity in Besley and Persson as a force for good if it 
leads to more homogenous preferences. Bad institutions, therefore, have a further reason for 
their persistence. Political action means collective action and while this may lead to one 
major problem (free-riding), a further problem is that free-riding may be overcome by direct 
expressive benefits and this may lead to expressive support for extractive institutions. This is 
particularly likely if the elite are especially skilled in manipulating expressive preferences 
focussed on identity. This idea is absent in both books, but (and I accept there may be a 
charge of bias), I think it would augment the theories put forward. 
 
5. Concluding comments 
 
Institutions are clearly at the cutting edge of research in political science, economics and 
beyond. At the time of writing this review, the historian Niall Ferguson is giving the 
prestigious annual BBC Reith lectures and he places institutions at the centre of his lectures. 
Indeed, he positively cites Acemoglu and Robinson’s book. Interestingly though, the focus of 
Ferguson’s lectures is not on institutions in developing countries, but (building on his 2011 
book) the possibility of decline in institutions in developed countries. This is a theme touched 
upon in Acemoglu and Robinson, but not addressed in Besley and Persson. An easily 
justifiable defence, of course, would be that their focus was on why some nations fail to 
achieve prosperity, rather than why some nations achieve it and then proceed to lose it. 
However, it is clear that there really is no nation that could be described as wholly inclusive 
or of complete common-interest. While it is the case that there are nations that do not 
experience political violence, invest in valuable public goods, contain well-developed legal 
systems and robust systems of checks and balances, it is also the case that they contain 
groups of aspirant rent-seekers attempting to undermine existing institutions and build, at 
least, some level of extractive institutions to enrich themselves at the expense of others. 
Indeed, this is precisely the theme of another high-profile recently published book, Stiglitz 
(2012). He provocatively argues that the United States has been hijacked by a privileged 
minority that has been very successful in increasing its wealth through extraction rather than 
production.  
 
So there is, in truth, no fully inclusive, common-interest state. Rather, it is a constant battle to 
maintain relatively good institutions. If this battle is not fought extractive institutions will 
take their place. With this in mind, I wonder if we should expand our set of literary allusions. 
The Anna Karenina matrix clearly makes sense in the context of Besley and Persson’s 
analysis. However, do happy nations really resemble each other? Does Switzerland really 
resemble the United States? More pertinently, is there any nation that is really happy? All 
nations struggle with market and political failures, and none solve these problems as well as 
might be hoped. Those that are prosperous seem to have been better at failing. Perhaps, the 
quotation from Samuel Beckett at the start of this review is a more apposite reflection of 
reality than that of Tolstoy’s and it also reminds us that institutions are ultimately human 
creations, requiring human effort. Difficult though it might be, in nations where institutions 
are demonstrably bad people can still try to improve them and where relatively good 
institutions have been forged, citizens need to be vigilant and protect them against the powers 
of extraction. 
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